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Abstract
Recent models of multi-stage R&D have shown that a system of
weak intellectual property rights may lead to faster innovation by in-
ducing firms to share intermediate technological knowledge. In this
article I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated tech-
nological knowledge, which has not been noticed so far but plays a
crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect
the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak in-
tellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technologi-
cal knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated,
as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of technological spillovers, a profit-maximizing firm may de-
cide to voluntarily reveal its intermediate innovative knowledge to rivals so as
to benefit from their “cooperation” in the subsequent stages of the research
(De Fraja (1993)). Building on this insight, Bessen and Maskin (2009) and
Fershtman and Markovich (2009) have developed models of multi-stage R&D
in which a system of weak intellectual property rights may foster innovation
by inducing firms to share intermediate technological knowledge1.
In this article I argue that this literature may have over-estimated the
potential benefits from a leaky system. I introduce a distinction between
two kinds of technological knowledge: plain and sophisticated, where tech-
nological knowledge is sophisticated if it requires a voluntary (even if cost
less) act to be acquired; by contrast, knowledge is plain when it is apparent
to everybody once it has been disclosed.2
In order to better understand this distinction, let us consider a few ex-
amples. The solution to a simple coded rebus3 is a good example of plain
knowledge. Similarly, the improved graphical user interface of a new operat-
ing system, or particular functional tools incorporated in a word processor,
are plain technological knowledge. On the other hand, consider a complex
mathematical proof, such as the proof of Fermat’s last theorem. The mathe-
1The role of disclosure in ensuring cumulative progress has also been studied, among
others by Scotchmer and Green (1990), Scotchmer (1991), Gallini (1992), Anton and Yao
(2004), Bessen (2005) and Denicolo` and Franzoni (2004) in different frameworks.
2That is, when knowledge is plain it is as if an inventor could simply send a message
to the public: “to progress in research you shall use technology z” and this is a sufficient
condition to let “z” become common knowledge to receivers.
3A rebus is a word-image riddle by which the only correct reading is veiled through
figures (where, for example, a picture of an eye stands for “I”).
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matical argument is very complex and proceeds by a long sequence of steps.
Thus, even if the inventor discloses the innovative knowledge, he or she cannot
take it for granted that those exposed to the proof have in fact understood it.
Here, innovative knowledge is “sophisticated” as agents can remain ignorant
even after disclosure.
The distinction between plain and sophisticated knowledge plays a crucial
role in how different appropriability systems shape the incentives to innovate
in patent races with dynamic technological complementarities. To see this
point, reconsider the reason why an inventor may want to disclose his superior
intermediate technological knowledge to its competitors. This is to enable
the rival to conduct research on an equal footing in the next stages of the
race, and hence to increase his research effort. Since under a weak property
regime the final innovation is not fully appropriable, the leader may then
benefit from the rival’s eventual success.
However, I contend that when innovative knowledge is sophisticated the rival
may prefer to remain ignorant and free-ride on the leader’s R&D effort in
the last stages of the patent race. This behaviour is prevented only if the
rival can be “forced” to acquire the innovative knowledge, as in the plain
knowledge case. In the sophisticated case, however, free-riding is a feasible
strategy. This means that knowledge acquisition will only take place if it is
incentive compatible.
To study this insight in greater depth, I develop a simple model of a multi-
stage patent race among two firms. The innovation is commercializable only
after all stages have been completed. I compare two different patent regimes:
the strong protection regime, where the first inventor alone can utilise the
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invention, and the weak protection, in which both firms can utilise the new
technology irrespective of who achieved it.
I show that in the plain technology case, weak protection can be socially
desirable in terms of both the pace of innovation and expected consumer
surplus. However, in the case of sophisticated knowledge, this result is re-
versed and a strong patent protection is typically socially desirable.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section I intro-
duce the model. In sections 3 and 4 I characterize firms’ equilibrium R&D
investment under both policy regimes; two subsections in Section 4 consider
separately the effects of technological knowledge being plain or sophisticated
in a weak protection regime. I then analyze the overall probability of innova-
tion in Section 5 and the expected consumer surplus in Section 6. In Section
7 I consider the effects due of the introduction of licensing contracts between
firms in the strong regime. The last section summarizes the main results and
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a multi-stage patent race where two risk-neutral firms, i = 1, 2,
conduct the research.4 The acquisition of innovative knowledge is sequential.
Each stage of research, when completed, produces an intermediate techno-
logical knowledge that is necessary to proceed to the the next stage.
At each period t firms select simultaneously and non-cooperatively a level
4Limiting the number of firms to two is for convenience only. When three or more firms
are considered, similar results are obtained numerically.
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of effort xit ∈ [0, x¯t]. The upper-limit x¯t is uncertain.5 It is drawn from a
probability distribution F on the interval (0, 1), independently and identi-
cally at the beginning of each period. For instance, it follows a uniform
distribution.
For simplicity, suppose that there are two stages of research, s = 1, 2, and
three periods t = 0, 1, 2. In the first periods, t = 0, 1, firms produce research
outcomes that are uncertain and depend on the effort exerted in R&D by
each contender. Specifically, each innovation requires one unit of time to be
developed, and any level of R&D investment is mapped into a probability
to successfully complete the current stage at the end of each period. In the
last period, t = 2, the innovation process is over and, if all steps have been
developed, profits are realized otherwise firms earn zero payoffs.
Note that, as a consequence of the described staggered research process, firms
obtain zero payoffs when there is even a single period without improvements
in research. Hence, they have incentives to speed up the process even with-
out the spur of competition, i.e. waiting one period is very costly.
Let us denote denote firm i’s current level of technological knowledge by
sit. All firms share the same initial level of knowledge which is standardized
to zero, i.e., si0 = 0 ,∀i. However, at the end of each period, knowledge may
5Uncertainty on the upper limit is not necessary for the results, but it captures the idea
that difficulties in research are unknown at the beginning of the race, and it is analytically
convenient.
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increase by one unit as the outcome of firm’s R&D effort. Specifically,
sit+1 =
 s
i
t + 1 with probability x
i
t
sit with probability 1− xit .
(1)
Hence, even if both firms are initially symmetric, over time their level of
knowledge can differ. The firm that leads the race is called “leader” while
the laggard is the “follower”. More specifically, a firm i is defined a leader if
sit ≥ t and we denote by Lt the number of leaders at period t.
In this model, firms’ knowledge may increase also because of imitation
which is assumed to be cost less and instantaneous. The only way to protect
intermediate inventions from imitation during the race is to keep them secret
from rivals. Thus, the leader must decide whether to disclose its knowledge
or to keep it secret.
The effects of disclosure depends on the nature of technological knowledge.
When technology is plain, the follower automatically reaches the leader’s
technological knowledge. By contrast, in the sophisticated technology case,
the follower choose either to ignore or utilise the disclosed intermediate
knowledge.6 This is represented in Figure 1 as one further decision node
in the game tree.
However, I assume that secrecy is no longer feasible when the good is com-
mercialized. One can imagine that when the innovation is eventually brought
6As a social phenomenon, the reluctance of the recipient to accept knowledge from the
outside (the “not invented here” syndrome) is well documented, see Katz and Allen (1982)
and Szulanski (2000). For example, in a software development context, this is the tendency
of both individual developers and organizations to reject suitable external solutions to
software development problems only because those were not internally developed, - in
other words, there are no other factors that dictate an internally developed solution would
be superior (http://www.developer.com).
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Figure 1: Cooperation and knowledge sharing at any period t when techno-
logical knowledge is sophisticated.
to the market, a cost less process of reverse-engineering may take place.
At the last period, if all stages of research have been completed, the
innovation is commercializable. For simplicity, the demand function for the
new product is assumed to be linear
P = α−Q (2)
where α ∈ R+ denotes the size of the market.
Firms’ payoffs depend on patent policy, which determines whether imita-
tion is lawful or not. As in Fershtman and Markovich (2009), I assume that
only the final innovation is patentable. Thus, intermediate discoveries are
left with no legal protection during the race, but they may be kept secret.7
As for the final innovation, I study two alternative regimes. The first, called
“strong”, prevents imitation, thereby creating a barrier to enter the final
7In other words, only the new good which encompasses all previous inventions, meets
the patentability requirements. Specifically, the non-obviousness requirement, which spec-
ifies the size of the innovative step needed to qualify for patent protection.
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market. This guarantees monopoly profits to the first inventor
Πm = Πm(α) , (3)
whereas the laggard obtains nothing.
The alternative regime, called “weak”, allows perfect, cost less imitation. In
this case, as soon as the new good is developed by one firm, it can be produced
and commercialized by both. Thus the market is always a duopoly, and firms
equally share profits
Πd = Πd(α, δ) ≤ Π
m
2
(4)
where the parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] captures the intensity of product market
competition. This allows me to study in a reduced form all possible com-
petitive configurations ranging from Bertrand (Πd = 0) to perfect collusion
(Πd = Πm/2).
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
• At t = 0, firms are symmetric, a value x¯0 is drawn, and firms set
their R&D efforts simultaneously. Nature then determines which firm
succeeds. Firms observe the progress in research of each contender.
• At t = 1, a value x¯1 is drawn, and the leader may decide to disclose or
keep secret its superior knowledge. If technology is sophisticated, the
follower decides whether to ignore or acquire the new technology when
it is available. Finally, R&D efforts are again chosen simultaneously.
Nature determines which firm succeeds.
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• At t = 2, if at t = 1 at least one firm succeeded, the good is commer-
cialized and firms earn profits.
3 Strong Patent Regime
To study the sub-game perfect equilibria of the model, I proceed backwards
starting from the product market equilibrium.
When imitation is prohibited by law, inventors can patent the new product
and exclude competitors in the final market. Hence, at t = 2, there are three
possible alternative scenarios. First, the innovation has not been attained,
both firms obtain zero profits. In the second scenario, only one firm has
developed and patented the good so monopoly prevails in the product mar-
ket. In the third case, both firms have completed all stages and both can
therefore apply for a patent. However, only one patent can be granted and
so, one inventor is chosen randomly. Thus, the product market is again a
monopoly.
Proceeding backwards, I consider period t = 1. Again, three cases can
arise. However, differently from before, inventors can not apply for exclusive
patent protection on the intermediate technology. Thus, the only effective
protection tool for the leader is secrecy.
To understand the leader’s incentives to keep the intermediate technological
knowledge secret or to disclose it, suppose that at least one firm grabbed
intermediate technological knowledge, so that L1 ≥ 1. Let use denote a
leader by l. After having observed the realized value x1, each firm l selects
9
a level of R&D expenditure so as to maximize the following expected payoff
function
U1 = x
l
1 ·
[
Πm +
(
1− (1 + y)L1−1) · Πm
2
]
− c · xl1 (5)
where y denotes the opponent’s expected intensity of research.
Note that (5) is decreasing in the number of firms active in research, i.e.,
L1 when y > 0. Every intermediate leader, therefore, will keep its superior
technological knowledge secret and thereby force the rival to quit competi-
tion, setting R&D investment to zero.
In this case, due to the linearity of payoffs, leader’s equilibrium R&D invest-
ment is either xl
∗
1 = x¯1 or zero. To avoid a proliferation of cases, however, it
is convenient to focus on the set of parameter values where research is always
pursued when there is one leader in the market. To be precise, I assume that
Πm ≥ c, which, given the linearity of the demand function (2), can be better
expressed in terms of market size,8
α ≥ 2√c. (6)
Hence, in this model, broad patents imply that competition in research can
occur only when both firms have innovated at the first stage. The following
8By looking at the market size I am making the ground ready for comparison between
different IPRs regimes. In fact, although it might seem natural to focus on profits, in a
strong regime firms may reach monopoly profits, whereas in a weak regime firms may earn
only half duopoly profits. Hence, market size can be easily adopted as a measure that is
common across regimes.
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lemma characterizes the equilibria when there is competition in research.
Lemma 1. Suppose that both firms have succeeded in the first period. Then,
there exists a threshold xˆ1 such that
(i) if x¯1 < xˆ1, the unique equilibrium investment in R&D is x
l∗
1 = x¯1, ∀l,
maximum effort,
(ii) if x¯1 ≥ xˆ1, the unique (symmetric) equilibrium investment in R&D is
xl
∗
1 = xˆ1, ∀l, limited effort. 
The intuition behind this result is simple. If there is no competition in
research, each firm always finds it profitable to invest in R&D to achieve
the latest innovation and, due to the linearity of the payoff function, the
investment level is set at the upper limit. With competition, on the other
hand, expected profits are reduced proportionally to the rival’s effort in R&D,
which again depends on the realized x¯1. If this value is “low”, i.e., below the
threshold xˆ1, both firms invest at the maximum level. This is because, con-
ditional on being successful, each firm has high probability of excluding the
rival through patents.9 By contrast, when the upper limit is “high”, i.e.,
above the threshold xˆ1, expected profits are not large enough to reward both
contenders. Here, firms must reduce their individual R&D investment so as
to break-even.
It is important to note that xˆ1 is increasing in α. Thus, the probability
that the realized upper limit will be above or below the threshold depends
directly on the market size. Specifically, the larger the market, the higher
9The probability that both firms will be jointly developing the next stage is small and
it gradually ceases to exist when the realized upper limit is small, i.e., (x¯1)
2.
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the probability that both firms will exert the maximum R&D effort.
Proceeding backwards to the first period, each firm i solves the following
problem,
max
x0∈[0,x0]
U0 = x
i
0 ·
2∑
k=1
yk(1− y)1−k · E0[U∗1 |L1 = k]− c · xi0 , (7)
where E0[U
i∗
1 |L1 = k] ≥ 0 denotes the expected profits from being leader.
Note that this payoff function is again linear in effort and decreasing in y.
However the slope can now be negative even without competition from the
other firm, i.e., y = 0. In other words, there are innovations whose size does
not allow investments at the first stage even when research is granted to a
monopolist firm.
The next lemma characterizes all equilibria.
Lemma 2. In the first period, there exists a threshold xˆ0 such that
(i) if xˆ0 < 0 both firms do not invest in R&D,
(ii) if x¯0 < xˆ0, the unique equilibrium investment in R&D is x
i∗
0 = x¯0 ∀i,
maximum effort,
(iii) if x¯0 ≥ xˆ0, the unique (symmetric) equilibrium investment in R&D is
xi
∗
0 = xˆ0 ∀i, limited-effort. 
Of course, given the recursive structure of the race, the equilibria de-
scribed above are analogous to the previous lemma. Again, the risk of facing
tough competition in the future can reduce investment at the current stage.
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Figure 2: Strong patent protection regime: equilibrium cut-off functions xˆ1
red curve and xˆ0 blue curve, for c = 1.
Furthermore, condition i) of the lemma tells us how large the demand pa-
rameter should be for firms to start investing in research. To be precise, firms
will invest in the first period if
α ≥ 2 ·
√
3c . (8)
Taking stock of all the results obtained so far, Figure 2 depicts the two
thresholds xˆ0 and xˆ1 as functions of the market size. We observe various
patterns of R&D corresponding to three different parameter regions: no ef-
fort, limited effort, and maximum effort region.
Specifically, the white area covers the no effort region where all firms do not
invest in R&D. In the shaded areas, all firms invest at the first stage and at
the second stage. However, for a small interval of values, the level of R&D
investment at the first stage depends on the realized upper limit. Therefore,
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individual R&D intensity can be lower than the realized upper limit, i.e.,
limited effort, or exactly the upper limit, i.e., maximum effort.
As a concluding remark for this section, it is perhaps worth noting that the
notion of technological knowledge does not play any role in a strong pro-
tection regime. This is simply because leaders do not have any incentive to
share their technological knowledge with followers.10
4 Weak Patent regime
In a regime of “weak” protection, there is no legal shield available for first
inventors, imitation is cost less and trade secret protection is not feasible
at the final step of the race. Hence, irrespective of who invented first, both
rivals will be competing on an equal footing in the product market.
In this setting, firms are effectively playing a game of private provision of
a public (from the viewpoint of the firms) good, i.e., innovative technolog-
ical knowledge. In this game, the leader always has an incentive to share
its innovative knowledge to the laggard so as to let him contribute to the
provision of the public good. However, there naturally arises an incentive
for the laggard to parasitize the leader’s effort. Because R&D investment is
chosen independently and simultaneously, the scope for free-riding depends
on whether the laggard can commit to apprehend innovative knowledge, as
in the sophisticated technological knowledge case, or not, as in the plain
technological knowledge.
10In a more general case, however, leaders could ask for money in exchange for their
superior knowledge. That is, firms can sign licensing contracts. Here I assume that any
form of licensing is forbidden for anti-trust reasons or, simply, impossible. This assumption
will be relaxed in Section 7.
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4.1 Plain Technological Knowledge
Let us first consider the case of plain technological knowledge by which a
disclosed intermediate technology becomes common knowledge to all players.
As before, I solve the game proceeding backwards.
Recall that at the end of the race, i.e., t = 2, neither secrecy nor intellectual
property law permit the leader to exclude its rivals, therefore firms equally
split duopoly profits
Πd(α, δ) = (1− δ) · Π
m
2
. (9)
Going back to t = 1, suppose that at least one firm improved its position
in the race, i.e., L1 ≥ 1. Now every technological leader sets a level of R&D
expenditure so as to maximize the following expected payoff function
Uw1 =
[
1− (1− xl1)(1− y)L1−1
] · Πd − c · xl1 (10)
where y is the opponent’s equilibrium R&D expenditure.
In this case, and differently with respect to the strong regime, the payoff
function (10) is increasing in L1 for y > 0. Therefore if only one firm goes
ahead in the race, the leader will always prefer to make its superior tech-
nological knowledge freely accessible rather than to keep it secret. Thus, a
weak regime of patent protection allows a shift from a strategy of secrecy to
a spontaneous emergence of cooperation.
At this point, it is important to examine the role of plain technological
knowledge. First recall that under this assumption a simple public message
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is a sufficient condition to pool contenders’ abilities. Therefore, whereas
with broad patents competition in research occurs only when firms improve
jointly at the first stage, here, whichever firm progresses in the race, the
other advances as well. Thus, firms are always symmetric at the second
stage. Building on this observation, the following lemma characterizes all
equilibrium outcomes at this stage.
Lemma 3. In the second period, if at least one firm has succeeded in the first
period, there exists a threshold xˆw1 such that
(i) if xˆw1 < 0 neither firm invests in R&D,
(ii) if x¯1 < xˆ
w
1 , the unique equilibrium investment in R&D is x
l∗
1 = x¯1 ∀l,
maximum effort,
(iii) if x¯1 ≥ xˆw1 the unique (symmetric) equilibrium investment in R&D is
xl
∗
1 = xˆ
w
1 ∀l, limited effort. 
As for the strong patent case, the equilibrium R&D investment depends
on a cut-off value xˆw1 . If the realized upper limit is above this value, firms
jointly moderate their R&D efforts, or else both exert the maximum effort
in research. Although similar in many ways, this equilibrium differs from
earlier behaviour because it is driven by the underlying public good game
played by firms. Indeed, as a result of the lack of patent protection, each
firm wants to free ride on the rival’s effort but both end up sharing the costs
of research as the only symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium in this game.
Again the threshold is a function of market size, and it allows us to pin down
the region of parameter values necessary to let firms do R&D at this stage
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of the race. That is,
α ≥ 2 ·
√
2c
(1− δ) . (11)
By contrasting this condition with the one corresponding to the strong patent
protection regime (6), we observe an important drawback of a system with
narrow patents in a multi-stage innovation race.11 That is, because the lack
of legal barriers in the product market reduces revenues to first inventors,
inventions need a higher final demand to be pursued at this stage. More
specifically, let us denote by ρ the ratio between the above condition and the
one for the strong protection regime (6), then we have that
ρ =
√
2
(1− δ) . (12)
It is straightforward to see that ρ is always larger than one and that, the
more intense is competition in the product market, the higher is the ratio.
Going back to t = 0, each firm i will solve the following problem
max
xi0∈[0,x0]
Uw0 =
[
xi0 + y · (1− xi0)
] · E0[Uw∗1 |L1 = 2]− c · xi0 , (13)
where E0[U
w∗
1 |L1 = 2] is the expected payoff when all firms are active in
research at the next stage. The next lemma characterizes equilibria.
Lemma 4. At the first period there exists a threshold xˆw0 such that
(i) if xˆw0 < 0 neither firm invests in R&D,
11As emphasized, among others, by Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Denicolo` (2000).
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Figure 3: Weak patent protection regime: equilibrium cut-off functions, xˆw1
red curve and xˆw0 blue curve, for δ = 0 and c = 1.
(ii) if x¯0 < xˆ
w
0 , the unique equilibrium investment in R&D is x
i∗
0 = x¯0 ∀i,
maximum effort,
(iii) if x¯0 ≥ xˆw0 , the unique (symmetric) equilibrium investment in R&D is
xi
∗
0 = xˆ
w
0 ∀i, limited effort. 
Again it is immediate to compute the condition under which the research
process can start. That is,
E0[U
w∗
1 |L1 = 2] ≥ c . (14)
To summarize the results, Figure 3 shows the two thresholds xˆw1 and xˆ
w
0
for the case of perfect collusion in the product market. Because collusion
ensures the highest possible reward to inventors under a weak regime, fixing
δ = 0 constitutes the “upper bound” case.
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As we may conclude from the comparison with Figure 2 of the previous
section, firms are now more likely to exert lower individual levels of effort than
in the strong protection regime. Broad patents, however, do not necessarily
produce higher aggregate levels of R&D. The reason is that, in a strong
patent protection regime, a leader does not share technological knowledge
with rivals. By contrast, in a weak regime, firms eagerly reveal information
and cooperate in research. Thus, narrow patents will ensure a higher overall
number of firms active in research at the intermediate stage.
4.2 Sophisticated Technological Knowledge
I next consider the case of sophisticated technological knowledge. Now, the
follower can pretend it has not acquired the intermediate technology even
when it is publicly available and imitation is cost less. In this model, I as-
sume that the follower can decide either to ignore or utilise the intermediate
knowledge after it has been disclosed by the leader. This gives the follower
the opportunity to commit not to conduct any second-stage research if this
commitment is profitable.
To better understand the motives behind this decision, suppose that at
t = 1 only one firm innovated, i.e., L1 = 1. Suppose that it is an equilibrium
for the follower, denoted by f , to choose to ignore the new technology. At
this point, the leader updates its beliefs about the rival’s R&D effort. And
thus, leader’s payoff function becomes
Uw
l
1 = x
l
1 · (Πd − c) (15)
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which equals equation (10) but with y = 0. For the same reason, we have
that the follower’s expected payoff is
Uw
f
1 = y
l · Πd (16)
where yl now denotes the leader’s R&D effort.
Recall that, by assumption (6), research on the latest invention is always
pursued by a monopolist firm at this stage. Therefore the leader will select
xl
∗
1 ≡ yl∗ = x¯1 at equilibrium.
Turning attention to the follower’s decision to ignore the available knowledge,
this is a sub-game perfect equilibrium as long as the payoff the follower ex-
pects when it quits research, but the leader act as a monopolist, is larger than
that from participating actively in research. This condition is the following
Uw
f∗
1 = x¯1 · Πd ≥ Uw
∗
1 . (17)
In other words, we may say that the decision to utilise the new technology
is not “incentive compatible” when the above condition is met. This leads
to the following result.
Lemma 5. Suppose only one firm succeeded in the first period, then the
follower will ignore the disclosed knowledge whenever the stand-alone R&D
investment of leader is greater than the corresponding investment when both
firms are active. Otherwise, the follower will utilise the disclosed knowledge
and invest in research. 
Note that this lemma hinges on the linearity of payoffs but the insight it
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delivers is far more general. The reason is simple. If technological knowledge
is sophisticated, firms are no longer making an effort simultaneously at the
second stage. In contrast to the plain case, the follower now has the possi-
bility to move first, ignoring the available technological knowledge, and thus
setting its effort to zero. Indeed, this possibility turns the strategic inter-
action among firms into a sequential public good game, e.g., Varian (1994).
That is, the follower will decide how much contributing to the public good
prior than the leader and the chosen contribution will be common knowl-
edge. In this case, as long as the follower’s decision to quit research has the
power to adequately raise the stand-alone contribution of the leader, utilising
the freely available technological knowledge may not be incentive compatible.
Going back to the first period, each firm i solves the following problem
max
xi0∈[0,x0]
U0 = x
i
0 ·
[
(1− y) · E0[Uwl
∗
1 |L1 = 1] + y · E0[U
w∗
1 |L1 = 2]
]
+
+(1− xi0) · y · E0[Uw
f∗
1 |L1 = 1]− c · xi0 (18)
The next lemma characterizes the equilibria at this stage.
Lemma 6. In the first period, when technological knowledge is sophisticated
and there is a weak regime of patent protection, R&D efforts depend on a
threshold xˆws0 that is non-greater than the corresponding cut-off value xˆ
w
0 in
the plain knowledge case. This is true for every α and δ.
Clearly, the expected gains from being a follower at the second stage will
translate into lower incentives to innovate in the first period. Given the
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linear structure of the model, this reduction is captured by a cut-off value
function xˆws0 that is smaller with respect to the case of plain technological
knowledge. Moreover, it is a matter of algebra to show that the difference
does not increase with market size α and in the intensity of competition δ.
Again, as the demand for innovation is larger and competition is less intense,
the free riding behaviour reduces and eventually ceases to be a problem for
innovation.
Finally, the condition on market size above which the research process can
start is the following
E0[U
wl
∗
1 |L1 = 1] ≥ c , (19)
which leads to the following result:
Corollary 1. In a regime of weak patent protection when technological knowl-
edge is sophisticated, the minimum level of market size required to stimulate
research is smaller than the one needed when technological knowledge is plain.
In summary, when firms are facing innovations with weak patent protec-
tion, the nature of technological knowledge involved can strongly alter the
equilibrium behaviour at every step of the race. The direction of such change
is unambiguous, innovations with sophisticated technological knowledge re-
duce the overall effectiveness of a weak system in developing cumulative in-
ventions. This is because it may not only result in the number of firms active
in research being reduced but also because the enhanced opportunity to free
ride at the second stage provides stronger incentives to reduce investment in
the first period as well.
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5 Expected Probability to Innovate
In this section, I examine some of the implications of different patent pro-
tection regimes. Specifically, I look at the expected probability to innovate
or pace of innovation. That is, I follow the preceding equilibrium analy-
sis for each regime to pin down the probability that all steps of innovation
are accomplished by at least one firm. This is with the purpose of building
a benchmark solution which can provide a basis for a comparison between
strong and weak patent protection.
From this perspective, studying first the probability to innovate also per-
mits the effects of a legal system on the innovation patterns to be studied
separately from those on consumers’ well-being. Then, in the next section I
examine how consumer surplus is affected by both regimes.
5.1 Strong Patent Regime
In a system ensuring strong patent protection, cooperation in research is
never spontaneous. Indeed, if only one firm succeeded at the first stage,
it will not disclose for free the new intermediate knowledge to the follower.
Therefore, only successful innovators will move forward in the race and invest
according to the equilibrium strategy of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
To compute the expected probability I proceed backwards. At the second
period, the probability that the second stage is developed by at least one firm
depends on the number of leaders and on the realized value x¯1. Because the
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upper limit is uniformly drawn, we have:
µ1(L1) =

0 if L1 = 0∫ 1
0
x¯1dx¯1 if L1 = 1∫ xˆ1
0
x¯1(2− x¯1)dx¯1 +
∫ 1
xˆ1
xˆ1(2− xˆ1)dx¯1 if L1 = 2 .
(20)
Going back to the first period, it is a matter of algebra to compute the prob-
ability that all steps of innovation are accomplished. This can be expressed
in a reduced form as
µ =
∫ 1
0
2∑
k=1
pk · µ1(k) dx¯0 , (21)
pk > 0 ∀k iff α > 2
√
3c
where pk denotes the probability that after the first period there are k firms
still active in research.
The pace of innovation (21) is illustrated in Figure 4 as a function of
market size, and for a fixed cost parameter. As expected, this probability ex-
hibits an s-shaped curve. This is because, as discussed before, there are three
different parameter regions in which R&D can occur with various intensities.
More specifically, there is zero R&D investment for low-demand inventions,
positive investment but of limited intensity for inventions of intermediate size
and finally, investment of maximum intensity in the remaining cases. At this
point, the curve touches an upper-bound µ¯ ≈ 0.4 and is constant.
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Figure 4: Pace of innovation under a strong patent protection regime (c = 1).
5.2 Weak Patent Regime
Now, consider a regime of weak patent protection, beginning with the case
of plain technological knowledge.
5.2.1 Plain Technological Knowledge
When the legal regime is such that patents are too narrow to protect revenues
in the product market, then leaders are incentivized to disclose voluntarily in-
termediate technological knowledge. In addition, if technological knowledge
is plain, followers cannot commit to preventing this technological sharing.
Therefore, if at least one firm moves forward in the race, the other firm ad-
vances as well and both will invest in research as described in Lemma 3.
Again, I proceed backwards to compute the pace of innovation. In the
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Figure 5: Comparison between the pace of innovation under a strong regime
(dot-dashed line) and a weak regime (solid line) with plain technological
knowledge. Fixed c = 1 and δ = 0.
second period, the probability to develop the last stage is
µw1 (L1) =

0 if L1 = 0∫ xˆw1
0
x¯1(2− x¯1)dx¯1 +
∫ 1
xˆw1
xˆw1 (2− xˆw1 )dx¯1 if L1 > 0
(22)
Thus, we have that the overall pace of innovation is
µw =
∫ 1
0
2∑
k=1
pwk · µw1 (k) dx¯0 , (23)
pwk > 0 ∀k iff E0[Uw
∗
1 |L1 = 2] ≥ c
where pwk denotes the probability that after the first period there are k firms
active in research.
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To better understand by how much the strong and the weak regimes are
different, Figure 5 plots both probability curves as a function of market size.
As the figure illustrates, the (solid) curve representing the probability of
success under a weak regime is positive for higher levels of market size and
increases at a slower rate with respect to the (dot-dashed) curve representing
the same probability under a strong regime.
Note that the two curves are monotonic and cross at α ≈ 5.5. Hence, al-
though broad patents deliver a higher pace of innovation for intermediate
values of market size, there exists a level of α above which the pace of inno-
vation is enhanced by a weak system. And note that this must be true as
long as the probability of success in a weak regime reaches an upper bound,
here µ¯w ≈ 0.44, which is higher than the corresponding value for a strong
patent regime.
The following proposition states the general form of this result:
Proposition 1. For every δ < 1, there exists a threshold value αˆ such that
• if α < αˆ the pace of innovation under weak protection is smaller than
under strong protection,
• if α ≥ αˆ, instead, the pace of innovation under weak protection is higher
than under strong protection.
Moreover the threshold is non-decreasing in δ. 
The above result can be easily understood when taking into account,
as emphasized among others by Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Fershtman
and Markovich (2009), the role of technological complementarity in multi-
stage innovations. For instance, when complementarity is better exploited by
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technological transfers, relaxing competition through weak patent protection
might increase the pace of innovation. Of course, a weak patent protection
regime reduces the expected rewards for inventors (that are strictly positive
for δ < 1). In a strong regime, on the other hand, the possibility to exclude
rivals via patents provides high-powered incentives to exert effort in research
but kills cooperation. Indeed, knowledge is never voluntarily transfered by
leaders.12 Thus, there exists a tension between inducing cooperation and
incentivizing research with higher rewards. As the market size increases,
however, such a trade-off finds a solution whereby a weak patent protection
regime should prevail in a market for innovations with larger demand.
5.2.2 Sophisticated Technological Knowledge
Under the assumption of sophisticated technological knowledge, the pace of
innovation in a weak system may change. Now when one single firm im-
proves one step in the race and discloses its superior knowledge, the follower
can decide whether to utilise the new technology or not at its own advantage.
Starting from the second period, by Lemma 5, we have that the proba-
bility that the second stage is developed is
µws1 (L1) =

∫ xˆw1
0
x¯(2− x¯)dx¯+ (xˆw1 )2
2
if L1 = 1
µw1 (L1) otherwise .
(24)
12Although it may be transferred by means of licensing contracts.
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Proceeding backwards, the overall pace of innovation is
µws =
∫ 1
0
2∑
k=0
pwsk · µws1 (k) dx¯0 (25)
pwsk > 0 ∀k iff E0[Uw
l∗
1 |L1 = 1] ≥ c ,
where pwsk is the probability that at least k firms will be active in research at
the second stage. Contrasting (23) with (25) ensues the following result:
Proposition 2. The pace of innovation in a regime of weak patent protection
with sophisticated technological knowledge is slower than the corresponding
one in the plain technological knowledge case. 
Corollary 2. When µw > 0 the difference (µw − µws) is non-negative and
tends to zero if and only if α→∞. 
In summary, the probability of innovating under a weak system is higher
when the technology is plain. Such a difference, however, reduces as long as
the prize from innovation increases and yet, it vanishes only in the limit case
where market size is infinite.
At this point our simple model demonstrates that inventions with sophis-
ticated technological knowledge might represent a limiting factor in overall
system performance with weak protection. The main logic behind this result
is that, although a regime encouraging cooperation may generate faster pace
of innovation, the free riding problem introduced by a weak patent protection
regime could weaken this positive outcome if firms are able to commit to and
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to quit research whenever it is convenient.
6 Consumer Surplus
The analysis of the previous section has shown how different patent systems
affect the pace of innovation. To better assess all the potential benefits from
either systems, it is convenient to explore now the overall effects on con-
sumers well-being.
A regime of strong patent protection always results in a monopoly in the
product market, and it carries relevant deadweight-losses and poor consumer
surplus.13 By contrast, a weak system can count on competition to provide
a larger range of alternatives that are more desirable from the viewpoint of
consumers. However, consumers seek a higher surplus combined with a sat-
isfactory probability that the innovation process is achieved. Hence, I shall
consider a measure that puts together the pace of innovation and the surplus
that is realized once all steps of innovation are accomplished.
Given the demand function (2), the consumer surplus can easily be com-
puted (see the appendix) and represented in a reduced form as a function of
13I am implicitly considering that a patent’s life is infinite. As we will discuss next,
an “optimized” patent regime may allow for finite patent life and this may reduce the
expected deadweight-loss under a strong regime. However, restricting attention to this
sub-optimal case will bolster the argument against a weak patent system.
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δ and α,
CS(α, δ) =
α2
8
(
1 + δ
1
2
)2
. (26)
This function encompasses both cases of duopoly and monopoly in the prod-
uct market. For instance, in the presence of a duopoly with perfect collud-
ing firms, i.e., δ = 0, equation (26) gives a consumer surplus that is the
same as that of a monopolistic market. Hence, let this value be denoted by
CSm(α) ≡ CS(α, 0).
By combining the consumer surplus in the product market with the pace
of innovation, I obtain a function representing the expected consumer surplus,
here denoted by ECS. Clearly, this function depends on the legal regime in
place and therefore it can be described by two distinct curves. If patent
protection is strong, it is
ECS = µ · CSm(α) , (27)
whereas, if patent protection is weak, it is
ECSw =

µw · CS(α, δ) if TK is plain
µws · CS(α, δ) if TK is sophisticated .
Fixing perfect collusion in the retail market, i.e., δ = 0, Figure 6 shows
both curves when technological knowledge is plain. Recall that, for δ close
to zero, both regimes offer roughly the same consumer surplus and the main
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Figure 6: Comparison between the expected consumer surplus under a strong
regime (dot-dashed line) and under a weak regime (solid line) with plain
technological knowledge. Fixed c = 1 and δ = 0.
Figure 7: Comparison between the expected consumer surplus under a strong
regime (dot-dashed line) and under a weak regime for δ = 1/3 (solid line)
and δ = 0 (dashed line) with plain technological knowledge. Fixed c = 1.
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difference is the pace of innovation. Again, hence, a weak regime performs
better with inventions of larger market size.
Suppose that there is a more intense competition in the product market,
i.e., δ = 1/3. By looking now at Figure 7, the curve for a weak regime rotates
when δ switches to positive values. This movement can easily be explained.
On the one hand, firms’ incentive to participate in the race are weakened,
i.e., the initial value of market size must be larger. On the other hand, the
difference between the expected consumer surplus in the two regimes grows
exponentially larger as the market size increases.14
This comparatively static result adds to the growing literature and the
common view that a weak patent system yields substantially larger social
benefits than a strong regime. Next I am going to show an example by
which, under the assumption of sophisticated technological knowledge, the
positive effects of a weak system could vanish.
Suppose there is a policy-maker that is supposed to maximize the con-
sumer surplus. The policy-maker knows the true demand parameter α or he
can estimate its generating distribution.15
Figure 8 depicts the ECS curves as a function of the intensity of competition
in the product market.
The expected consumer surplus in a strong regime is obviously a constant
function of the intensity of competition. Whereas the ECS from a weak sys-
tem varies in a non-monotonic way with respect to δ. This is simply because
14Note that the expected consumer surplus (26) increases exponentially in α and it
grows faster for δ > 0.
15As is considered in Bessen and Maskin (2009).
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Figure 8: Comparison among the expected consumer surplus under a strong
regime (dot-dashed line) and under a weak regime with plain technological
knowledge (solid line) and under a weak regime with sophisticated techno-
logical knowledge (dashed line). Fixed c = 1 and α = 5.
the pace of innovation is monotonically decreasing in the intensity of com-
petition from a positive value towards zero, whereas the consumer surplus is
monotonically increasing.
More importantly, we observe that as far as the case with plain technologi-
cal knowledge is considered, there exists a set of parameter values of δ such
that ECS is enhanced by a weak system. This result, however, is strikingly
overturned in the sophisticated case.
In summary, as this simple example shows, a policy-maker should care-
fully take into account the appropriate definition of technological knowledge
before adopting a weak system of patent protection.
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7 Licensing
In general firms are able to enter contracts to share technology and seek
positive licensing fees. To capture the role of licensing contracts in a simple
way, suppose that the follower could offer a contingent contract to induce
the leader’s disclosure. As long as offers leave the leader’s expected profits
untouched after disclosure, technological sharing can be achieved even in
a strong patent protection regime.16 By restricting attention to the upper
bound case, i.e., δ = 0, the following result ensues from licensing:
Proposition 3. The overall performance of a strong patent protection system
is enhanced by the presence of licensing contracts. Moreover, if δ = 0, the
expected consumer surplus of a strong regime is greater than or equal to that
of a weak regime with plain technological knowledge.
As illustrated in Figure 9, licensing substantially improves social welfare
in a strong regime, thus compensating some of the advantages highlighted
for a weak regime. And yet, for δ > 0, a weak regime could perform better.
However, a full comparative statics on such other cases is beyond the scope
of this article. This is simply because a full comparison between the two
regimes should also consider a strong patent system that is “optimized”. In
that case, a strong system may compensate the improved performance of a
weak patent regime by setting, for instance, adequate length and breadth of
patents.
16For example, the contract could state that if the licensee develops the new invention,
it keeps all profits. By contrast, if both firms develop the last stage invention at the same
time, profits accrue to the earlier innovator only.
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Figure 9: Comparison between the expected consumer surplus under a strong
regime without licensing (dot-dashed line), with licensing (dashed line) and
under a weak regime with plain technological knowledge (solid line). Fixed
c = 1 and δ = 0.
8 Conclusions
In their influential article, Bessen and Maskin (2009) claim that the reason
why stronger intellectual property rights might not promote innovation has
to do with sequential complementary innovations. The concern of this arti-
cle is that this literature may have over-estimated the potential benefits of a
weak system.
To address this issue, I developed a simple model of multi-stage patent
race among two firms. At each step, firms will produce intermediate techno-
logical knowledge that they may decide to share with the rival. I study the
incentives to cooperate and share new competences under two alternative
definitions of technological knowledge which the standard literature has not
explored so far. Hence, I studied the patent race when technological knowl-
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edge is either plain, whereby it becomes common knowledge once disclosed,
or sophisticated, by which even if freely accessible, it transmits only when
firms decide to utilise it. I compare two different patent regimes: the strong
protection regime, where the first inventor alone can utilise the invention,
and the weak protection, in which both firms can utilise the new technology
irrespective of who achieved it.
I show that in the plain technology case, weak protection can be socially
desirable in terms of both the pace of innovation and expected consumer sur-
plus. However, in the case of sophisticated knowledge, this result is reversed
and a strong patent protection is typically socially desirable. The reason is
simple. Because R&D investment in a weak regime can be seen as a public
good from the viewpoint of firms, lagging behind firms may want to commit
to fully free-ride on leader’s effort. However, this strategy is feasible only
when technological knowledge is sophisticated, whereas it is prevented in the
case of plain technology.
The model demonstrates, further, that if firms are allowed to contract
licensing fees for technology sharing, broad patents provide a faster pace of
innovation than a weak system. Therefore the potential benefits of a weak
system are limited to the smaller dead-weight losses eventually generated in
the product market. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that this outcome should
be better examined and contrasted with an optimized strong patent regime,
by which length and breadth are set to maximize social welfare.
Finally, a straightforward policy implication comes out of this work. That
is, the policy-maker should carefully look at the technological nature of inven-
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tions when deciding to ease protection rules intended to foster cooperation.
Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
At the first period, if both firms succeed, i.e., L1 = 2, the payoff function (5)
is linear in xl1, and its slope depends on y. Therefore I can define the level
of y such that the slope of (5) vanishes. That is,
xˆ1 ≡ 2 ·
(
1− c
Πm
)
(28)
By the linearity of the demand function, this is equivalent to
xˆ1 = 2 ·
(
1− 4c
α2
)
(29)
Notice that xˆ1 is also the level of rival’s effort such that leader’s expected
reward is zero, irrespective of its own effort. Hence, if this threshold exhibits
negative values, the optimal action of both firms is to choose zero invest-
ments. However, if restricting attention to α > 2
√
c, this case is ruled out.
At the beginning of t = 1 an upper limit x¯1 is drawn. It can be either one
of two alternative scenarios. First, consider that x¯1 < xˆ1 whereby expected
profits are positive for any rival’s level of R&D. Hence, a unique equilibrium
exists in which both agents exert the highest level of effort, i.e., xl
∗
1 = x¯1 ∀l.
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Consider, next, the opposite case in which x¯1 ≥ xˆ1. Here, multiple equilibria
arise. There are two possible asymmetric equilibria: either xl
∗
1 = x1 and
y = 0 or vice-versa. However there is also a unique symmetrical equilibrium
in which effort is xl
∗
1 = y = xˆ1. In this equilibrium, both firms earn zero
expected profits. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
At period t = 0, the upper limit x¯1 has been not drawn yet. However, firms
face uniform priors about its realization. Thus, by using Lemma 1, expected
payoffs can be computed for every level of x¯1 and then averaged over all
possible upper-limit values. If L1 = 1, we have that
E0[U
∗
1 |L1 = 1] =
∫ 1
0
x¯(Πm − c)dx¯ = (Πm − c)/2 , (30)
whereas if L1 = 2, we have that
E0[U
∗
1 |L1 = 2] =
∫ min{xˆ1,1}
0
(
x¯ · (2− x¯)Π
m
2
− c · x¯
)
dx¯ . (31)
Again, I can define a level of rival’s R&D such that the slope of (7) vanishes.
That is,
xˆ0 ≡ E0[U
∗
1 |L1 = 1]− c
E0[U∗1 |L1 = 1]− E0[U∗1 |L1 = 2]
. (32)
Notice that (32) is a function of market size and, after some algebra, it can be
shown that it is non-negative when α ≥ 2 · √3c. When α < 2 · √3c the slope
is negative and all firms minimize the function selecting zero R&D effort.
Finally note that x¯1 ≥ 1 is equivalent to 2 ·
√
2c which is smaller than 2 ·√3c.
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This implies that, if firms exert positive effort at the first stage, it must
be true that they will exert the maximum effort at the second stage. This
observation simplifies a lot (32) that now reduces to
xˆ0 ≡ 3 ·
(
1− 12c
α2
)
(33)
The rest of the proof is analogous to the previous lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.
In a weak patent regime with plain technological knowledge, intermediate
inventors disclose for free their technological knowledge and followers cannot
prevent sharing. Therefore, by the linearity of (10), the equilibrium R&D
investments depend again on a cut-off function
xˆw1 ≡ 1−
8c
(1− δ) · α2 . (34)
And in an analogous manner to the analysis conducted before, we have the
reported solutions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.
At the second period, firms are always symmetric, either L1 = 2 or L1 = 0.
Because the upper limit is random, expected payoff must be averaged for all
possible realizations. That is,
E0[U
w∗
1 |L1 = 2] =
∫ xˆ1
0
[
1− (1− x¯)2]Πd − c · x¯ dx¯+ ∫ 1
xˆ1
(Πd − c) dx¯ (35)
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Therefore it can be defined a new threshold xˆw0 . Whereas, the remaining
parts of the proof are analogous to earlier lemmas. Q.E.D..
Proof of Lemma 5.
Suppose initially that the firm chooses to “uilise” the available technology.
Again the decision is taken after x¯1 is drawn and the realization known.
Thus, two cases are possible. Suppose first that x¯1 ≤ xˆw1 , and recall that the
decision to utilise the intermediate knowledge is an equilibrium if
x¯1Π
d ≤ x¯1(2− x¯1)Πd − cx¯1
But this expression is equivalent to x¯1 ≤ xˆw1 , as it has been assumed at the
beginning. Hence, it is a sub-game perfect equilibrium in this case.
Suppose next that x¯1 < xˆ
w
1 , now can prove by contradiction that the decision
of utilising the new technology is not an equilibrium. Specifically, the above
condition can be rewritten as x¯1 ≤ xˆw1 that is against the initial assumption.
Therefore it is not an equilibrium in this case. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.
If innovation is of the sophisticated type. It does not alter competition when
both firms succeed at the second period. It changes instead incentives when
lagging behind firms can decide to quit the race depending on the realized
x¯1.
Given the recursive linear structure of payoffs, this R&D pattern reflects
into a cut-off that is necessarily lower than the corresponding function for
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the plain case. Hence, averaging payoffs over all possible realization of x1,
we have that
E0[Uˆ
f∗
1 ] =
∫ xˆw1
0
x¯[(2Πd − c) + x¯)]dx¯+
∫ 1
xˆw1
x¯Πddx¯ (36)
E0[Uˆ
l∗
1 ] =
∫ xˆw1
0
x¯[(2Πd − c) + x¯]dx¯+
∫ 1
xˆw1
x¯[Πd − c]dx¯ (37)
Thus, in the same manner as before, I define a new threshold xˆws0 and by some
simple algebra it can be shown that this is non-greater than xˆw0 . The remain-
ing part of the proof is the same as that in previous cases. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1. If δ < 1, notice that when α → ∞ then the
pace of innovation in a weak regime reaches an upper-bound that is 0.44
which is above the corresponding value in a strong regime, i.e., 0.40.
Recall further that the pace of innovation in a weak regime is continuous and
takes positive values for α that are higher than in the case of strong patent
protection. Therefore there must be a finite value of α such that both curves
crosses.
Proof of proposition 2.
It comes straightforward from Lemma 5 and 6.
Proof of Proposition 3.
As a first step, notice that in a weak patent protection regime the introduc-
tion of licensing does never alter equilibria. This is because if firms know that
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the leader will disclose for free its intermediate knowledge then, the latter
can not credibly seek for positive fees.
In a strong regime, instead, I suppose that followers are able to offer the type
of contract described in the text. Therefore their payoff function becomes
U f1 = x
f
1(1− yl)Πm − c · xf1 . (38)
However, given the structure of the contract, leaders are not going to reduce
their equilibrium R&D effort and so, xl
∗
1 = x¯1. This implies that a follower
will exert positive effort if (1−x¯l)Πm ≥ c, therefore if x¯ < 1−c/Πm, otherwise
it sets R&D effort to zero. This possibility turns into a the following cut-off
at the first period,
x˜0 =
E0[U
l∗
1 ]− c
E0[U l
∗
1 ] + E0[U
f∗
1 ]− E0[U∗1 ]
(39)
and so the expected probability to innovate µsl is computed and can be
contrasted with the previous result. Q.E.D.
B Consumer Surplus
As a first step consider the product market as a monopoly. If all steps of
innovation are accomplished, and assuming null marginal cost in production,
the equilibrium quantity produced is qm = α
2
= pm. Thus, Πm = α
2
4
. And
so it is a matter of simple algebra to compute the social surplus in this case
Sm = α
2
8
.
Then, suppose that the product market is a duopoly. Now, the corresponding
43
equilibrium quantity is arguably greater than that under monopoly: qd =
(1 + γ)qm with γ ≥ 0. Therefore, pd = α− α
2
(1 + γ).
Hence, by the definition of duopoly profits, i.e., Πd ≡ (1−δ)Πm/2, we obtain
γ = (1 − δ)1/2. Finally, by substituting the resulting γ into the function of
social surplus under duopoly, this turns out to be equation (26).
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